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PROTECTING PUBLIC VALUES IN THE 
PLATTE RIVER* 
ERIC PEARSON AND J. DAVID AIKEN~ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Little Blue Natural Resources District v. Lower Platte North 
Natural Resources District ('Zittle Blue I'y,l a 1980 case dealing with 
the proposed transfer of Platte River water by the catherland Irriga- 
tion Project to the Blue River basin, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
ruled that, for the first time in almost half a century, interbasin2 
transfers of surface water were legal in Nebra~ka.~ Prior to Little 
Blue I, the 1936 Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irri- 
gation District4 decision had prohibited interbasin transfers. That 
prohibition had frustrated large-scale water development, limiting 
water use controversies to a scale decidedly more local and defined. 
Instream water uses for fish, wildlife and recreation, moreover, had 
not yet become a direct legal threat to Platte basin irrigation develop- 
ers, although this too would change. 
Little Blue I signalled the end of this apparent calm in the Platte 
River Valley. By allowing interbasin development for the first time, 
the decision triggered a rush for Platte River water by would-be irri- 
gators in nearby river basins. These irrigators were facing water 
shortages caused by earlier drastic drawdowns of groundwater sup- 
plies. They now saw an open door and raced to obtain appropriations 
* Research support for this article was provided in part by the Nebraska 
Agricultural Experiment Station. 
t Respectively Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law; B.A., 
1968; J.D., 1972, Duquesne University; LL.M., 1977, George Washington University, and 
Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics (Water and Agricultural Law Special- 
ist), University of Nebraska-Lincoln; B.A., 1972, J.D., 1975, George Washington 
University. 
1. 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980) bereinafter Little Blue I ] .  
2. Interbasin transfers are now defined by statute to include "the diversion of 
water in one river basin and the transportation of such water to another river basin for 
storage or utilization for a beneficial use." NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-288(3) (Reissue 1984). 
3. Little Blue 1, 206 Neb. at  548, 294 N.W.2d at  604, overruling Osterrnan v. Cen- 
tral Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936). See R. 
HARNSBERGER & N. THORSON, NEBRASKA WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 362-64 
(1984); Aiken, New Directions i n  Nebraska Water Policy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 8, 53-55 
(1987); Note, Water Law-T~ansbasin Diversions inNebraska, 14 CREICHTON L. REV. 
887, 887 (1981). 
4. 131 Neb. 356,268 N.W. 334 (1936). Regarding O s t m a n ,  see R. HARNSBERGER 
& N. THORSON, supra note 3, a t  354-57; Oeltjen, Harnsberger & Fischer, Interbasin 
Trnmjks: Nebraska Law and Legend, 51 NEB. L. REV. 87, 104-07 (1971). 
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for "rescue  project^."^ 
This release of enthusiasm for development was restrained by 
Little Blue Natural Resources District v. Lower Platte North Natural 
Resources District ("Little Blue II'y,6 the followup decision in the 
same case, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that water 
appropriations are subject to the Nebraska Nongame and Endangered 
Species Conservation Act ("NESCA").7 Specifically the court ruled 
that interbasin transfers could not be approved by the Nebraska De- 
partment of Water Resources ("DWR") until it had consulted with 
the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission ("GPC") regarding 
whether proposed water transfers would interfere with endangered 
wildlife species or their GPC-designated critical habitats8 
Little Blue I1 forced a realization among the water development 
community that Nebraska irrigation projects were subject to state (as 
well as federal) environmental laws. No more would irrigators enjoy 
the tacit assumption that their proposed projects and water transfers 
would be viewed as beneficial public values.g Now, just as federal 
laws could delay and even stop irrigation projects on public interest 
grounds,1° so could state laws and state judicial decisions.ll 
5. The Platte River Irrigation Project promoters are without exception repre- 
sentatives of irrigators in areas with declining ground water supplies. Aiken, supm 
note 3, at 46 nn.226-27. If irrigators can obtain a publicly subsidized water project, they 
can avoid imposing ground water regulations to control ground water depletion. Id. 
6. 210 Neb. 862, 317 N.W.2d 726 (1982) [hereinafter Little Blue II]. 
7. Id. at 866, 317 N.W.2d at 730. See Pearson, Constitutional Restmints on Water 
Diversions in Nebraska the Little Blue Controversy, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695, 703 
(1983); Aiken, supra note 3, at 55-57. See also NEB. REV. STAT. $9 37-430 to -438 (Reis- 
sue 1984) (codifying the NESCA). 
8. Little Blue 11, 210 Neb. at 872, 317 N.W.2d at 733. The so-called "no jeopardy" 
provision of the NESCA is section 37-435(3) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. NEB. 
REV. STAT. $37-435(3) (Reissue 1984). The central reach of the Platte River, the Platte 
River bottoms, has been designated as critical habitat by the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service. See 43 Fed. Reg. 20,938, 20,941 (1978) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 8 17.95(b) 
(1985)). This action was taken pursuant to the Federal Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 16 U.S.C. $8 1531-40 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 
9. Aiken, supra note 3, at 9-18. 
10. Federal statutes imposing environmental evaluation and protection require- 
ments on irrigation projects include the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
("NEPA"), Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. $8 4321-4370a (1982)); sec- 
tion 404 of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments ("Clean Water 
Act"), 33 U.S.C. $ 1344 (1982) (dredge and fill permit requirements), and the Federal 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("FESA"), 16 U.S.C. $9 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. I 
1983). For an in-depth discussion of each requirement, see Aiken, supra note 3, at 22- 
40. The O'Neill irrigation project has been delayed by NEPA litigation to the point 
that the project itself is in doubt. Aiken, supm note 3, at 26. The Catherland project is 
the first to be delayed by state environmental requirements, although the Twin Platte 
water project appropriation application was later denied by the DWR for failing to 
comply with state endangered species consultation requirements. In re Applications 
A-15995 and A-16006, 223 Neb. 430, 437-38, 390 N.W.2d 506, 511 (1986). 
11. "State adjudicative decisions" includes administrative ones, a point driven 
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These legal developments have set the stage for a struggle for 
Platte River water now prototyped by the Catherland case itself and 
surely to be reenacted for the remainder of the century. The strug- 
gle casts at loggerheads the economic interests of irrigators who view 
Platte River water as a means to continue irrigated agriculture and 
the conservation interests of others who view interbasin transfers as 
ominous to wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic use of the stream. The 
struggle raises, moreover, water use conflicts decidedly of a statewide 
(if not national) nature, conflicts which importantly implicate the 
public interest. 
This Article will discuss the matter of water rights administra- 
tion in Nebraska when such administration significantly affects pub- 
lic interests. First, it will examine substantive legal requirements in 
Nebraska that should govern protection of the public interest in 
these cases. In this regard, the Article will focus especially on how 
public interest factors should enter into decisionmaking. Second, the 
Article will comment on procedures appropriate for such water allo- 
cation decisionmaking. Lastly, it will review the administrative han- 
dling of the Catherland irrigation project proposal itself as a case 
study of how the primary state agency implicated in these matters, 
the DWR, is addressing its substantive and procedural responsibilities 
to date.12 
11. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
Both common and statutory law require the DWR to protect the 
public interest when making water allocation decisions that signifi- 
cantly affect environmental values. This law has been little litigated 
in Nebraska, although it has been more extensively developed in 
other western states. 
The first source of law requiring consideration of public interest 
and values in water rights decisionmaking can be found in what is 
home by the GPC in its subsequent ruling that the Catherland project would, if con- 
structed, violate the Nebraska Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act. 
See Neb. Game & Parks Comrn'n, Biological Op., Little Blue-Catherland Project 81 
(Feb. 8, 1985); Aiken, supra note 3, at 57. The DWR refused to follow the GPC opin- 
ion. See Order Approving Applications A-15145, A-15146, A-15147 and A-15148 as- 
signed to the Catherland Reclamation District (July 29, 1986) (Neb. Dep't of Water 
Resources) ("DWR order"). 
12. This Article will not deal with the basic principles or procedures of water pro- 
ject appropriation. For a discussion of those issues, see R. HARNSBERCER & N.THOR- 
SON, supra note 3, at 73-86; Aiken, supra note 3, at 12-16. 
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known as the public trust doctrine.13 The public trust doctrine was 
established by judicial decree of the United States Supreme Court in 
1892 in the landmark decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. nli- 
nois.14 In that case, the legislature of the state of Illinois had at- 
tempted to statutorily transfer into private hands submerged lands 
off the Chicago harbor on Lake Michigan. Recognizing the folly of 
this endeavor, it later reneged by enacting another statute purport- 
edly voiding the initial transfer. The Railroad challenged the legality 
of the recant, prompting the Supreme Court's far-reaching opinion. 
In ruling that the submerged land did indeed belong to the state, 
the Court held that title held by states in submerged lands is "differ- 
ent in character" from that held by the state in other lands.15 Such 
title, said the Court, is "held in trust for the people of the State that 
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction 
or interference of private parties."16 Thus was the public trust doc- 
trine born. 
The message of the doctrine is a straightforward one. First, 
there are legitimate public values in waters of a state.17 These in- 
clude recreational pursuits, commerce, and general use. Second, 
states holding title to resources of particular value to the general 
public hold that title in a trust capacity, a trust the state "can no 
more abdicate . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the adrnin- 
istration of government and the preservation of the peace."ls This 
trust responsibility proscribes significantlg proposed transfers of 
rights unless they promote trust purposes (i.e. the public interest); 
alienations of public rights to private control are not permissible 
when they undercut trust purposes. 
Numerous states have moved forward in developing a public 
trust jurisprudence. Two cases are particularly notable. The first 
case is United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water 
13. For an excellent overview of the public trust doctrine, see R. HARNSBERGER &
N .  THORSON, supra note 3, at 307-13; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re- 
sources Law: ufective Judicial Infewention, 68 MICH.  L. REV. 471, 490 (1972). The 
Sax article traces the historical development of the public trust doctrine. 
14. 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892). 
15. Id. at 452. 
16. Id. 
17. The trust has been held routinely to apply to waters, extending the rationale 
of nlinois Cent. which applied it to submerged lands. See Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 
67 Neb. 325, 351, 93 N.W. 781, 789 (1903). 
18. Rlinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453. 
19. The trust does not apply to all transfers of property rights out of public con- 
trol, but only to those which due to the resource affected and the transfer itself under- 
cut trust purposes. See Sax, supra note 13, at 556-66. 
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Conservation C~rnmiss ion .~~ In United Plainsmen, the North Da- 
kota Supreme Court ruled that the public trust doctrine required 
state water officials to establish short- and long-term plans for natu- 
ral resource conservation and development before granting water ap- 
propriations, even though the statutes authorizing such studies were 
perrni~sive.~~ The case is signrficant for it rejected water rights alloca- 
tion on a first-come-first-served basis if such an administrative 
scheme ignored relevant public interest considerations. United 
Plainsmen stands for the obvious principle that water rights applica- 
tions may not be viewed in isolation; to the contrary, they must be 
viewed in the larger context of overall stream management. 
The second major case is National Audubon Society v. Superior 
In this decision, the California Supreme Court gave a more 
expansive reading to the trust. It held that the trust not only applied 
to publicly held resources, and not only imposed a duty to consider 
public values during administrative decisionmaking, but actually 
could require the divestiture of private rights in water if the public 
interest so required.23 Under this reading, the trust flatly subordi- 
nates private property rights to the public interest, a major theoreti- 
cal step in its development. 
The public trust doctrine has received wide acceptance in varying 
degrees since its announcement. Nebraska itself has recognized the 
trust in the case of Crawford Co. v. H a t h a ~ a y . * ~  Crawford stated 
that "the water and the soil [under navigable streams] belong to the 
state, and are under its sovereignty and domain, in trust for the peo- 
~ l e . " ~ ~  Beyond these general acknowledgements, however, the trust 
remains unrefined in Nebraska's jurisprudence. 
While these decisions among the states do not conform in all par- 
ticulars, they do make it clear that the public trust is real, that it ap- 
plies to significant water rights decisionmaking, and that it exists in 
Nebraska. That it does exist in Nebraska means that the DWR must, 
at the least, insure that its decisions to grant private property rights 
in public waters include, in some real way, a consideratio~l of public 
interests and values. In the context of the Platte River, it means that 
the DWR should not award valuable water rights simply because the 
applicant is first in line and meets some minimal age-worn statutory 
criteria fashioned for use in a time when most water rights disputes 
20. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). 
21. Id. at 459. 
22. 33 Cal. 3d 419,658 P.2d 709,189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983). For an in-depth analysis 
of the case, see R. HARN~BERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 3, at 309-13. 
23. National Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360. 
24. 67 Neb. 325, 351, 93 N.W. 781, 789 (1903). 
25. Id. 
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were between neighbors. To the contrary, the trust requires in- 
dependent public interest review with decisionmaking based on the 
outcome of that review. 
How should the review affect decisions? The answer is not fully 
revealed, given the scant common law development of the trust in 
Nebraska. But, at a minimum, one would reasonably extract two 
principles. First, in an absolute sense, the DWR should only grant in- 
terbasin water rights to an applicant if its application proposes a pro- 
ject and water diversion that, considered in isolation and on its 
merits, would better serve the public interest than would no project 
or diversion at all (a "project merit" analysis). Second, in a relative 
sense, the DWR should only grant a water right to an applicant if its 
application proposes a project and water diversion that, considered 
along with other competing applications for projects and diversions, 
would better serve the public interest than would the competing pro- 
posals (a "project comparison" analysis).26 
B. PUBLIC INTEREST PROTECTION 
In addition to trust responsibilities, most western states have an 
independent statutory obligation to assure public interest protection 
in water rights decisionmaking. The statutes imposing these obliga- 
tions usually fail to detail the range of considerations which agencies 
must undertake to satisfy the mandate, leaving courts to flesh out the 
requirements. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court did so in Young v. Hinder- 
l i d e ~ . ~ ~  In that case, it ruled (in line with public trust-based deci- 
sions) that states need not grant water rights to any applicant which 
satisfies minimal water rights criteria regarding "diversion," "benefi- 
cial use" and so forth. While grants of water rights on these exclu- 
sive bases might suffice in some, indeed many, more routine cases, in 
situations when more than one application for water rights from the 
same hydrologic source is pending before the agency, and the stream 
has insufficient water to support both, the agency, said the court, 
may give the nod to the more beneficial project proposal and reject 
the other.28 The water rights denial could occur even if the rejected 
applicant's project met these same minimal criteria. 
26. It need not be argued here whether the public interestlpublic trust responsi- 
bilities of the DWR would require the rejection of a pending project because some hy- 
pothetical future project could well arise. The argument made here is more narrow, 
that the DWR must conduct the comparison analysis at least insofar as other projects 
in relatively concrete and complete stages of design and implementation are con- 
cerned. Perhaps the DWR should consider all competing projects contemporaneously. 
27. 15 N.M, 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910). 
28. Id. at -, 100 P. at 1050. 
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This holding - that water rights may be withheld from one pro- 
ject so that a subsequently filed but more beneficial one may go for- 
ward - is important because it defeats applicants' claims of any 
"entitlement" status under applicable statutes. 
This incorporation of public interest protection as an independ- 
ent element of water rights decisionmaking has found its way also 
into Nebraska law. In Kirk v. State Board of I r r i g ~ t i o n , ~ ~  the Ne- 
braska Supreme Court faced for the first time the basic question of 
whether the State Board of Irrigation, the predecessor agency to the 
DWR, was authorized by statute to place conditions on water rights 
secured by individuals. In other words, could the state limit private 
rights to water for public benefit? The court was unambiguous in its 
conclusion: 
In this state, running water is publici juris. Its use belongs 
to the public and is controlled by the state in its sovereign 
capacity. A riparian proprietor cannot appropriate it without 
permission of the state. The state then has such a proprie- 
tary interest in the running water of its streams and in the 
beneficial use thereof that it may transfer a qualified owner- 
ship or right of use thereof. When it grants such ownership 
or right of use it may impose such limitations and conditions 
as its public policy demandsm30 
The case goes on to note that the State Board of Irrigation is the 
"guardian of the public welfare in the appropriation of the public wa- 
ters of the state, and this necessarily devolves upon that board a large 
discretion in such matters."31 
Kirk establishes a principle subordinating private claims in water 
to public rights. Such conditions and limitations on private water 
rights "as public policy demands" are not only authorized but are re- 
quired. As with the public trust, the precise parameters of the pub- 
lic right are unspecified in Nebraska, but some conclusions zy-e again 
warranted. First, the DWR, having inherited the duties of the State 
Board of I r r i g a t i ~ n , ~ ~  must protect the public interest. Second, the 
range of protection is at least coextensive with that required by the 
public trust doctrine. In underlying rationale and purpose, the two 
are parallel: the DWR should conduct both a project merit analysis 
and a project comparison analysis to protect the public interest. 
- - - - 
29. 90 Neb. 627, 134 N.W. 167 (1912). 
30. Id. at 631, 134 N.W. at 168-69 (citations omitted). 
31. Id. at 632, 134 N.W. at 169. 
32. NEB. REV. STAT. 4 46-209 (Cum. Supp. 1986). See also In re Application of 
Ainsworth Irrigation Dist., 170 Neb. 228, 238, 102 N.W.2d 429, 434-35 (1960) (holding 
that the DWR has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to water 
rights for irrigation). 
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In addition to these judicially formulated responsibilities, the 
DWR must also meet a new statutory requirement. After the Little 
Blue I decision prompted release of pent-up demand for Platte River 
water, the legislature moved to protect the river. It did so by enact- 
ing section 46-289 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, which estab- 
lishes a list of public interest criteria to be considered and satisfied 
before any grant of water rights for an interbasin diversion can go 
forward.33 Those criteria are: 
(1) The economic, environmental, and other benefits of 
the proposed interbasin transfer and use; 
(2) Any adverse impacts of the proposed interbasin 
transfer and use; 
(3) Any current beneficial uses being made of the unap- 
propriated water in the basin of origin; 
(4) Any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial use of 
the water in the basin of origin; 
(5) The economic, environmental, and other benefits of 
leaving the water in the basin of origin for current or future 
beneficial uses; 
(6) Alternative sources of water supply available to the 
applicant; and 
(7) Alternative sources of water available to the basin of 
origin for future beneficial uses.34 
The statute goes on to stipulate that an application shall be deemed 
to be in the public interest if the overall benefits to the state and the 
applicant's basin are greater than or equal to the adverse impacts to 
the state and the basin of origin.35 Any order of the DWR under the 
section must be accompanied by a discussion of the enumerated fac- 
tors and a recitation of the totality of reasons for the decision, com- 
plete with factual findings, documentation and references to hearing 
transcripts and other sources relied upon in the formation of the 
decision.36 
This list of criteria postulates an interbasin public interest deci- 
sionmaking process in Nebraska of a rather sophisticated sort. The 
first two criteria demand consideration of water use factors, the next 
three criteria demand consideration of impacts to the basin of origin, 
and the last two demand consideration of alternative water supply 
possibilities. The list is not exclusive, setting forth the only considera- 
tions to be made; the legislature rather made it expressly 
33. NEB. REV. STAT. 8 46-289 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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nonincl~sive.~~ 
These criteria reiterate the same kinds of substantive require- 
ments established earlier by judicially formulated public trust and 
public interest protection rationales. Again, it is clear that the DWR 
has far-reaching responsibilities to guard the public interest. As ex- 
pressly set forth in section 46-289, they include duties to undertake a 
project merit analysis to consider carefully the hydrological conse- 
quences of its decisions, and to be especially sensitive to the problems 
of the basin of origin. In its general thrust, section 46-289 indicates 
that projects, even if they meet conventional minimum criteria for 
water rights, must not infringe impermissibly on public values. 
The statute, moreover, mandates the DWR to undertake the pro- 
ject comparison analysis required by public trust and common law 
considerations. First, because the section recites a noninclusive list of 
criteria, it is meant to expand and clarify, not contract, DWR public 
interest protection. The section thereby in a real sense statutorily 
ratifies the pre-existing judicially imposed public trust and public in- 
terest responsibilities. 
Second, considerations (1) and (2) of the statute (the so-called 
water use requirements) by their terms require assessment of bene- 
fits and adverse impacts of each proposed interbasin transfer and use. 
Obviously, the DWR cannot assess such impacts in isolation. The 
only way to assess such impacts is by reviewing all in-basin and out- 
of-basin benefits and adverse impacts, a review which necessarily en- 
tails an examination of opportunities to be realized or foreclosed by 
grants or denials of water rights to competing applicants. The DWR 
simply cannot realistically assess beneficial and adverse impacts of a 
proposed water rights allocation without looking to the effects its de- 
cision would visit on other water use possibilities. 
Consideration (5) of section 46-289 lends further support to this 
interpretation. That consideration expressly requires the DWR to 
evaluate "economic, environmental, and othek benefits of leaving the 
water in the basin of origin for current or future beneficial uses."38 
The DWR can only do this, of course, with reference to other "cur- 
rent or future beneficial uses" to which remaining unappropriated 
water could be allocated. Those "current or future beneficial uses" 
would include all other pending intrabasin and interbasin water 
rights proposals seeking diversion rights from the stream of origin, 
It is notable that the legislature, when enacting section 46-289, 
was not focusing on the precise issue of whether the DWR should un- 
dertake project comparison analyses when reviewing interbasin di- 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 5 46-289(5). 
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version water rights applications. The legislature rather was 
predominantly attentive to the more parochial concern of whether 
intrabasin uses of waters should be legally preferred over interbasin 
ones.39 But the political debates of 1981 do not alter the meaning of 
the statutory text, nor do they dilute the legislature's obvious desire, 
as demonstrated by section 46-289 itself, to heighten protection of 
public values rather than reduce it. 
We would be remiss at this juncture not to note the ultimate 
source of state law, the Nebraska Constitution. It also injects public 
interest protection into the water rights decisional mix. Article XV, 
section 6, of the Nebraska Constitution states that the "right to divert 
unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use 
shall never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the 
public interest."40 This section, which is a guide for legislative ac- 
t i ~ n , ~ l  demonstrates a fundamental state policy elevating public 
rights to a superior position. This constitutional acknowledgement is 
significantly distinguishable from that in other states.42 Among 
other things, it serves to encourage a broad interpretation of public 
rights and public interest protection statutes. 
A final relevant source of law is the NESCA.4s This act provides 
that no state agency may take actions which will jeopardize the con- 
tinued existence of an endangered or threatened species or modify its 
critical habitat.44 The NESCA is modeled after the federal Endan- 
gered Species but if anything it is more stringent than its 
model. While the federal legislation admonishes federal agencies to 
insure their actions "[are] not likely to jeopardize . . . endangered 
species,"46 the state analog demands that agencies "do not jeopardize 
. . . endangered . . . species."47 It is, in short, a nondegradation 
standard. 
Like its federal counterpart, the NESCA sets forth a procedural 
39. 1 NEB. LEG. J., 87th Leg., 1st Sess. 1120-21, 1518, 1534-35,1791-95,1861-63, 2144- 
45 (1981) (noting various amendments to L.B. 252 affecting intrabasin and interbasin 
uses). Accord Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 506, 136 P.2d 957, 962 (1943). 
40. NEB. CONST. art. XV, $ 6. 
41. See Pearson, supra note 7, at 704-12. 
42. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, $ 6, which provides: "The right to divert the unap- 
propriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." This 
section contains no qualifier to protect the public interest, as is found in article XV, 
section 6, of the Nebraska Constitution. 
43. NEB. REV. STAT. $ 37-430 to -438 (Reissue 1984). 
44. Id. $ 37-435(3). 
45. 16 U.S.C. $ 1536(a)(2) (1982). See Aiken, supra note 3, at 29-40. 
46. Id. 4 1536(a)(2). 
47. NEB. REV. STAT. $37-435(3) (Reissue 1984). 
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requirement in addition to this substantive nondegradation standard. 
Section 37-435(3) requires state agencies other than the Water Man- 
agement Board48 to "consult with" the GPC49 to determine whether 
proposed agency action would threaten the continued existence of 
threatenedS0 or endangeredS1 species or their critical habitatsas2 The 
consultation provision is meant to improve the quality of the agency's 
ultimate decision by informing it with the expertise of the GPC. 
While final decisional responsibility in these matters rests with 
the agency proposing action, the GPC opinion is more than advisory. 
The GPC cannot veto proposed agency actions,53 but if its views are 
contrary to those of the agency proposing action, courts on judicial 
review will likely grant less deference to the final determinati0n.5~ 
111. PROCEDURAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
Having outlined substantive legal requirements for protection of 
the public interest incumbent upon the DWR in its interbasin trans- 
fer water rights decisions, let us now turn to procedural matters. 
The DWR enjoys both rulemaking and adjudication powers.55 Water 
rights allocation decisionmaking invokes primarily the adjudicative 
powers of the agency.56 Traditionally, the DWR undertakes its adju- 
48. Projects evaluated by the GPC during initial agency review need not be 
reevaluated a second time during any subsequent Water Management Board considera- 
tion. Id. $ 2-15, 111 (Cum. Supp. 1986). See i d r a  notes 67-80 and accompanying text. 
49. The consultation process involves both informal and formal discussion, corre- 
spondence and other contacts between the agency and the GPC in accordance with 
GPC regulations. NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. tit. 163, ch. 6 (1986). 
50. "Threatened species" are defined as "any species of wild fauna or flora which 
appears likely to become endangered, either by determination of the [Game and Parks] 
commission or by criteria provided by the [federal] Endangered Species Act." NEB. 
REV. STAT. $ 37-431(11) (Reissue 1984). 
51. "Endangered species" are defined as "any species of wildlife or wild plants 
whose continued existence as a viable component of the wild fauna or flora of the state 
is determined to be in jeopardy or any species of wildlife or wild plants which meets 
the criteria of the [federal] Endangered Species Act." Id. $ 37-431(4). 
52. Critical habitat is habitat designated as such by the GPC. Id. 5 37-435(3). 
53. Little Blue Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte N. Natural Resources 
Dist., 210 Neb. 862, 872-73, 317 N.W.2d 726, 733 (1982) [hereinafter tittle Blue II]. Ao 
c w d  National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 1976) (interpreting 
section 7 of the Federal Endangered Species Act); Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 
F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977), dfd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (interpreting section 1536 of 
the federal Endangered Species Act). See Aiken, supra note 3, at 30-32 1111.120-38. 
54. Universal Camera Corp. v, National Labor Relation Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 496-97 
(1951). 
55. NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-209 (Reissue 1984). 
56. As a general matter, adjudications are narrowly focused decisions on whether 
a closed set of persons have complied with some pre-existing standard. Rulemaking is 
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dicative role by using what can be called "conventional" proce- 
d u r e ~ . ~ ~  Using this approach, the agency adjudicates as would a court. 
It receives evidence dispassionately from applicants, objectors, and 
other interested persons in a relatively formal setting. A hearing is 
convened, at which parties are afforded the chance to both submit 
and refute evidence and to make arguments on the legal issues of the 
case. The agency, of course, monitors the hearing and at its conclu- 
sion evaluates the evidence received. The end product is (hopefully) 
a well-reasoned decision based exclusively on the record produced 
during the hearing itself.58 This decisionmaking format is under- 
standably popular on the theory that agencies undertaking adjudica- 
tion are well to model themselves on those institutions created for 
that sole function, such as the courts. 
This conventional approach is not the only one available to agen- 
cies, however. Another avenue that we might call a "protective" ap- 
proach incorporates much of the conventional, but does not confine 
the agency to the exclusive role of a recipient of independently sub- 
mitted evidence. Under a protective approach, an agency undertakes 
an additional function. While continuing its conventional role, it as- 
sumes the additional responsibility of generating and affirmatively 
submitting evidence bearing on the issues under review. This ap- 
proach expands the agency function beyond the mere evaluation of 
third-party evidence into the realm of first-hand investigation and 
advocacy.59 
The question becomes which of these generally described adjudi- 
cative models is appropriate for the DWR when it makes decisions 
implicating both private and public interests. Some general reference 
to DWR water rights administration is helpful at this point. Histori- 
- - - - - -- - - - - - 
quasi-legislative decisionmaking that establishes policy of future impact and general 
effect, governing actions of persons potentially unascertained at the time of rulemak- 
ing. The distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is of constitutional signifi- 
cance, as greater due process rights attach generally to matters appropriate for 
adjudication than to matters appropriate for rulemaking. See Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 379 (1908). 
57. Agencies typically enjoy a wide latitude when selecting decisionmaking proce- 
dures. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun- 
cil, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
58. Agency adjudicative procedures will vary greatly and can be compared in a va- 
riety of ways. The comparison undertaken here should be read in light of the argu- 
ments presented. See iqfm notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
59. Agencies may, and routinely do, undertake functions that are quasi-legislative, 
quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial in nature. Such a combination of functions presents 
no constitutional infirmity, so long as the undertaking of one function does not encum- 
ber the agency's ability to undertake the others. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,58 
(1975); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 577 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
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cally, the DWR adjudication task has been in large part mini~ter ia l .~~ 
Disputes presented for DWR adjudication in the common case arose 
from local water rights competition implicating no major public val- 
ues controversies. The DWR would receive a request for a water 
right from a party seeking to secure water from a running stream. 
The applicant would show in the proceeding that unappropriated 
water is indeed available for diversion, and that the diversion would 
serve some stipulated beneficial use.61 The only parties likely to ob- 
ject, if any, would be persons living immediately downstream of the 
water rights claimant. Objections would be futile if  the claimant sat- 
isfied the minimum criteria. The DWR's decision would turn on fac- 
tual findings easily made, for example, whether there was sufficient 
unappropriated water in the 
The conventional adjudication model suited these cases well. 
The agency could rely on the contestants to produce evidence of a 
quality and comprehension sufficient to decide the relatively narrow 
issues presented, and the agency could rest reasonably assured that 
contestants would understand fully the issues of the case and partici- 
pate actively in it. 
The conventional model, however, is less suitable when the 
agency's decision involves an interbasin transfer. These water rights 
controversies are qualitatively different than local, intrabasin ones. 
Interbasin transfer proposals are regional and statewide in scope, im- 
plicate complex environmental and economic concerns, and often can 
pit the interests of the residents of one basin against those of 
anotheraG3 
In short, these decisions unavoidably implicate the public inter- 
est. For that reason, the DWR should adopt a protective adjudication 
model. Conventional adjudication procedures offer no assurance that 
such protection of public values will be forthcoming or even that any 
person interested in protecting public values will be present and par- 
ticipating. If the DWR does not affirmatively protect the interests of 
the public in these circumstances, those interests may go unconsid- 
ered. Public values will be protected by coincidence, or not at all. 
Adopting a protective model of adjudication would not be a novel 
undertaking. The approach has been assertively ratified by the 
60. See State ex re1 Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239, 246 (1940). 
61. For a discussion of the factual demonstration required of an applicant, see R. 
HAF~N~BERGER & N. THORSON, supra note 3, at 74-75. 
62. This is not to say that every decision lacks complexity. The interstate alloca- 
tion of water rights, see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and cases involving 
deliverable quantities of water, as well as others may appropriately be characterized as 
complex. 
63. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (Cum. Supp. 1986). 
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courts. Exemplary is the landmark 1965 decision in Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Cortference v. Federal Power C~rnrni s s ion ,~~  a case deal- 
ing with the proposed construction of a pumped storage hydroelectric 
facility on a stream in New York. The case supplied the Second Cir- 
cuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to comment on the adjudicative 
procedures of the Federal Power Commission: 
In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed 
to be the representative of the public interest. This role does 
not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and 
strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the 
public must receive active and affirmative protection at the 
hands of the Cornrnissi~n.~~ 
This theme has been echoed among the federal courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, since its ann~uncement .~~  
These cases confirm that agency adjudicative procedures should 
assure active public interest review and protection. If private liti- 
gants, therefore, do not present the "public rights case," it is the 
agency's duty to do so. In such instances, it is incumbent upon the 
agency to obtain and present such evidence to agency decisionmakers 
as is necessary to inform them fully of the public interest rarnifica- 
tions of their decisions. To the extent that the conventional model of 
adjudication fails to accomplish this, it is deficient. 
Even though the DWR has occupied our attention thus far, it is 
-- -- 
64. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
65. Id. at 620. 
66. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372, 386-92 (1967) (stating that 
the agency's outlook and powers must extend beyond, in this case, the interest of rail- 
roads); Power Auth. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 743 F.2d 93, 103-12 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (stating that the public must receive affirmative protection at the hands of 
the agency); RKO General, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 670 F.2d 215, 232 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 620) (stating that " 'proceedings 
before the Commission are not private law suits,' " and the Commission should not 
simply receive evidence); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, v. United States Nu- 
clear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted) (stating 
that the agency should not "depend solely on whatever contributions intervenors hap- 
pen to make to develop a fair representation of scientific opinion for the record."); 
Transarnerican Trailer Transp., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 492 F.2d 617, 628 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that the weight to be given the public interest criterion shall 
vary from one context to the next; Iowa Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 
F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1973) (Lay, J., dissenting) (citing Scenic Hudson favorably); Cal- 
vert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 620) (stating that the 
agency should consider environmental values "at every distinctive and comprehensive 
stage" of the decisionmaking); Aberdeen & R.R.R. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 695, 
711-12 (E.D. La. 1967) (stating that the national interest should not be determined and 
depend on evidence offered or held back by interested parties). 
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not the only agency in Nebraska involved in water rights decision- 
making. There also exists the Water Management Board ("WMB"), 
which has independent power to affect public values in the Platte 
River and other major Nebraska streams. 
Created in 1984 by Legislative Bill 1106 ("L.B. 1106"),67 the 
WMB was the legislature's response to developers' concerns that 
state and federal environmental litigation was unduly delaying 
needed water projects.68 Comprised of five members, its charge is to 
"identify, propose, support, advocate, resolve conflicts regarding, and 
expedite water development projects in the state in the most efficient 
manner possible."69 Project review is accomplished by requiring 
sponsors of major water projects costing more than $10 million, and 
for which sponsors are requesting state advocacy for federal funding 
assistance, to submit their projects for WMB review.70 Project spon- 
sors requesting state financial assistance for project construction 
must also file with the WMB.71 
In reviewing proposed projects, the WMB must make several 
public interest-founded determinations. It must: (1) determine 
whether the proposed project is consistent with Natural Resources 
Commission water use goals; (2) determine whether the project is 
technically, environmentally, financially and economically feasible; 
(3) attempt to resolve conflicts regarding the project, including plac- 
67. L.B. 1106, 1984 Neb. Laws 1341, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984) (codified at NEB. 
REV. STAT. $ 2-15,107 (Cum. Supp. 1986)). The bill itself was based on recommenda- 
tions to Governor Robert Kerry from his "Water Independence Congress," a group of 
private citizens convened over several months to formulate water policy for the state. 
See Aiken, supra note 3, at 58-59. The Congress was called as a direct response to Lit- 
tle Blue ZI and the GPC Catherland jeopardy opinion. Id. at 55-57. One of the primary 
purposes of the Congress was to find a way to resolve developer-environmentalist dis- 
putes by negotiation rather than by expensive and time-consuming litigation. For a re- 
view of this litigation, see id. at 32-40. The case affecting Platte River development 
was Nebraska v. Rural Electric Administration, 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. (BNA) 1156 (D. 
Neb. 1978). In that case a Wyoming project was delayed for filing an inadequate envi- 
ronmental review of, inter alia, the project's effects on downstream whooping crane 
critical habitat in the central Platte area. When the court enjoined the project pending 
a revised impact statement, the settlement included establishing a $7.5 million Platte 
River Whooping Crane Habitat Maintenance Trust. The Trust has been correctly 
identified by developers as a de facto environmental defense fund regarding Platte 
River development. 
68. NEB. REV. STAT. $4 2-15,107 to -15,117 (Cum. Supp. 1986). See Aiken, supm 
note 3, at 57-59. 
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-15,107 (Cum. Supp. 1986). WMB members include the Di- 
rector of the University of Nebraska Conservation and Survey Division (the State Ge- 
ologist), the GPC director, the Director of Natural Resources, and two gubernatorial 
appointees, one with expertise in water resources development and management. Id. 
$2-15,108. The Director of Natural Resources chairs the WMB. Id. 
70. Id. $ 2-15,114(1). The application must be filed prior to filing with the DWR 
for project water appropriations. Id. 5 2-15,114(2). 
71. Id. 2-15,116(2). 
376 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20 
ing conditions on project design and operation if necessary; and (4) 
determine whether a project is in the state's interest.72 If the pro- 
posed project meets these project approval criteria, the WMB must 
"assume acquisition of state interest [in the project] and take such ac- 
tions as are necessary for the implementation, financing, water right 
approval, or advocacy regarding the project."73 WMB approval is also 
a prerequisite for project sponsors to obtain state water planning 
grants or state advocacy for federal water planning as~is tance .~~ 
The WMB review process is yet another legislative ratification of 
the requirement to protect public interest in cases involving major 
water transfers, although the attainment of this goal is compromised 
by the express requirement that the WMB "promote" large-scale irri- 
gation projects.75 Nonetheless, its integral function in water project 
development gives it substantial leverage to encourage project devel- 
opment and design compromises on behalf of the public. It now plays 
a critical structural role in the water rights administration process, a 
role different from that played by the DWR. 
This role, however, has been circumscribed by the same legisla- 
tion that created it, L.B. 1106, while mandating project sponsors to 
file for WMB approval76 as a general matter, makes that same filing 
requirement elective for project applicants who have filed with the 
DWR for water rights prior to February 15, 1985.77 This circumscrip- 
tion is especially disconcerting because all of the projects currently 
competing for Platte River water fall into the pre-February 15, 1985 
category.78 Thus, the potential exists that, at this critical point in Ne- 
braska's natural resources history, the WMB will never perform the 
function for which it was designed. 
72. Id. 2-15,110(1). Project sponsors seeking construction funds must also com- 
ply with endangered species requirements. Id. §$2-15,111-15,116(2). Project sponsors 
seeking state water planning assistance must also demonstrate via preliminary project 
designs that spending additional project planning funds is "a reasonable use of state or 
federal funds." Id. $ 2- 15,116(3). 
73. Id. $ 2-15,116(2). 
74. Id. §$ 2-15,114(1) to 15,116(3). 
75. Id. Presumably the W M B  would be prohibited from promoting, financing, or 
supporting unapproved projects at state and federal levels. 
76. Id. $ 2-15,114(2). 
77. Id. $ 2-15,114(3). While others "must" file for WMB approval (assuming they 
seek state financial or other assistance), pre-February 15, 1985 projects "may" do so. 
78. There are currently six such proposed projects, each of which is the general 
subject matter of numerous applications filed before the DWR. The projects, by popu- 
lar name, and their filing dates are as follows: Prairie Bend project, filed April 1,1976; 
Catherland project, filed Nov. 28, 1977; Enders project, filed Dec. 19,1980; Plum Creek 
project, filed Sept. 1, 1981; Twin Platte project, filed Sept. 23, 1981 and Oct. 9,1981; and 
Landmark project, filed Dec. 17, 1981. Summary of Proposed Projects from the Platte 
and South Platte Rivers (rev. Jan. 27, 1986) (available at the Neb. Dep't of Water Re- 
sources, Lincoln, Neb.). 
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Certainly the legislature was aware of this disingenuous possibil- 
ity. Presumably for that reason, it gave the DWR in the same legisla- 
tion the power to rectify the problem. Section 46-209, amended by 
L.B. 1106, provides that the DWR "may submit any application re- 
ceived by it to the Water Management Board for review."79 If the 
DWR chooses to do so, then the public interest-protective role of the 
WMB can be realized. The authors would take the principle a step 
further. We submit that the overriding duty of the DWR to protect 
the public interest, a duty which arises from its public trust and pub- 
lic interest responsibilities,8O argues convincingly for routine DWR 
submissions of major water project appropriation applications to the 
WMB. Such referrals should be foregone only if the WMB plainly 
could provide no palpable benefit by its additional review. 
By way of interim summary, we draw the following conclusions: 
(A) The DWR has common law, public trust, and statutory du- 
ties to protect the public interest. These duties attach to any sigmfi- 
cant water rights allocation decisionmaking, including those 
involving interbasin transfers. The DWR neglects these responsibili- 
ties if its review process fails to consider public interest factors fully. 
A full consideration includes both project merit and project compari- 
son analyses; 
(B) The DWR has independent duties under the NESCA to pro- 
tect endangered species. In meeting those responsibilities, it must 
give great weight to relevant findings and opinions of the GPC on 
those matters; 
(C) DWR procedures must assure an active and affirmative rep- 
resentation of the public interest; 
(D) The DWR should routinely incorporate the WMB into the 
decisionmaking process even with respect to water projects not ex- 
pressly covered by the applicable statutory law. 
How the DWR will honor these responsibilities in the future is 
unknown. The recent administrative handling of the Catherland 
project, however, provides us with some insights on the DWR's cur- 
rent understanding of its responsibilities. To this case study, we now 
turn. 
IV. THE CATHERLAND PROJECT 
The DWR first formally learned of the Catherland project on 
November 28, 1977, when the Little Blue Natural Resources District 
79. NEB. REV. STAT. 9 46-209 (Reissue 1984). 
80. See sum notes 13-42 and accompanying text. 
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filed several applications for water rights.%l The project as proposed 
would draw water from the Platte River basin near the "Big Bend" 
area of the stream for transportation into the Little Blue River basin 
in part to replenish declining groundwater reserves there.82 
The director of the DWR initially denied the applications, rely- 
ing on the aforementioned Osterman ban on interbasin diversions in 
the state. After the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed that holding 
in Little Blue I, the DWR undertook its first substantive review of 
the applications. The review yielded the expected preliminary con- 
clusion that the proposal met all of the basic requirements necessary 
for a favorable water rights decision,83 but because the applications 
proposed an interbasin diversion, the DWR also considered public in- 
terest factors. Specifically, it reviewed the proposal in light of the 
section 46-289 public interest considerations and those set forth in the 
NESCA to protect endangered species.84 As part of its review, it held 
an extensive adjudicatory hearing on the case, during which both 
proponents and opponents were heard. At the conclusion of the pro- 
ceedings, the Director of the DWR, who himself presided at the hear- 
ing, ruled in favor of the applicants. The water rights were granted 
by administrative order on July 29, 1986.85 
A. DID THE DWR ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 
The DWR order acknowledged rightly that the degree of eco- 
nomic gain occasioned by the project would vary depending upon the 
availability of federal crop subsidies.86 Other project benefits ad- 
81. Order, supra note 11, at 1. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at  2-3. Other noncontroversial issues were also presented: whether unap- 
propriated water was available for appropriation as per section 46-234, whether the 
width of the river was a t  least 100 feet at the proposed water diversion point as per 
section 46-206, and whether the Catherland Reclamation District had demonstrated by 
documentary evidence that it, together with the Central Nebraska Public Power and 
Irrigation District ("Tri-County"), had agreed that Catherland would be permitted to 
use Tri-County's canals to deliver water for Catherland, as per section 46-234(1). The 
DWR concluded that Catherland complied with all three requirements. Id. at 3. How- 
ever, the original agreement authorizing use of the Tri-County supply canal was exe- 
cuted between Tri-County and the Little Blue Natural Resources District, the 
Catherland Reclamation District's predecessor in interest, When Little Blue assigned 
its rights to Catherland, that assignment had not been formally ratified by Tri-County. 
Id. The DWR concluded that because Tri-County had formally supported the Little 
Blue application, it seemed reasonable to assume that Tri-County continued to support 
the project now that it was being promoted by Catherland. In fact, Tri-County had not 
formally ratified the assignment. However, subsection 46-234(1) is discretionary, so the 
DWR's failure to require documentary evidence of Tri-County's granting permission to 
Catherland to use the Tri-County supply canal probably is not reversible error. 
84. Order, supra note 11, at  3-5. 
85. Id. at 18-19. 
86. Id. at 4. The order did not acknowledge, however, that a withdrawal of fed- 
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dressed by the Director included potential fish, wildlife and recrea- 
tion enhancements, although the director conceded that such benefits 
were modest.87 
The Director found few adverse impacts. Some private parties 
complained of land use interference, but the Director concluded their 
arguments were not factually supported.88 Concerns regarding re- 
duced groundwater recharge resulting from reduced river flows were 
also dismissed as largely in~ignificant.~~ Adverse effects on game spe- 
cies, other species, fisheries, and recreation were also deemed "negli- 
gible," "not significant," or 
This discussion of public interest considerations fulfilled the 
D m ' s  duty under the first two considerations of section 46-289.91 
Thereafter, the Director dutifully marched through the remaining 
seven criteria and ultimately concluded that "benefits to the state . . . 
which would result from operation of the Catherland project out- 
weigh those which would result if the four water appropriation appli- 
cations were denied. In the context of 0 46-289 they should be 
appro~ed.''~2 
Setting aside the credibility of the particular factual findings of 
the Director, and the ultimate water rights approval those findings 
purportedly it is immediately clear that the DWR failed to 
conduct an inquiry as broad as legally required. Specifically, it never 
undertook any effort to compare the Catherland water use proposal 
with others pending before it,94 an obligation mandated by the judi- 
cially pronounced public trust and public interest responsibilities of 
the agency and, as we view it, by section 46-289 itself. 
Moreover, in reaching its conclusion, the DWR also failed to in- 
corporate available information regarding the Platte River itself. 
There are currently underway several studies designed to supply new 
era1 crop supports would leave irrigators with high production costs generally in ex- 
cess of the available price. Thus while the project economic benefits from irrigation 
may be positive as long as crops are subsidized, the removal of crop subsidies could 
turn economic benefits into economic losses. Regarding the inadvisability of publicly 
subsidizing irrigation projects in order to increase production of publicly subsidized 
crops, see Aiken, supra note 3, at 40-43. 
87. Order, s u p a  note 11, at 5-6. Flood control benefits were also noted. Id. at 6. 
88. Id. at 6-8. Similarly, the loss in lost riparian real estate values from reduced 
ground water recharge and reduced streamflows was deemed insignificant. Id. at 8. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 13-17. 
91. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
92. Order, supra note 11, at 11-13. 
93. The DWR order is now on review before the Nebraska Supreme Court. 
Catherland Reclamation Dist, v. Central Neb. Conservation Ass'n, No. 86-692 (filed 
Aug. 27, 1986). 
94. See supm notes 13-42 and accompanying text. 
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and helpful data on the entire Platte River ecosystem, the carrying 
capacity of the stream, and so forth.95 At a minimum, this data is suf- 
ficiently relevant and important to warrant its close review by the 
DWR. 
B. DID THE DIRECTOR ADEQUATELY PROTECT ENDANGERED SPECIES 
AND GIVE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE GAME AND PARKS 
COMMISSION? 
The DWR's primary responsibility under the NESCA is to 
"tak[e] such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, 
funded, or carried out by [it do] not jeopardize the continued exist- 
ence of such endangered or threatened species or result in the de- 
struction or modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined by the commission to be critical."96 As its terms indicate, 
the duty is a stringent one. The agency's goal is the total abolition of 
jeopardy, as distinct from allowing some reasonable or minimal 
harm. Additionally, the agency must insure, not reasonably hypothe- 
size, that this nondegradation result will materialize. Not even a rea- 
sonable uncertainty is authorized. In the absence of certainty, the 
DWR must deny a permit, not grant it, as uncertainty strips away the 
ability to insure no jeopardy. 
Did the DWR meet this stringent requirement in its Catherland 
decision? Clearly, it did not. First, the order only discussed three spe- 
cies: the whooping crane, bald eagle and interior least termg7 It did 
not discuss potential jeopardy to other endangered or threatened spe- 
cies, species with habitat requirements that may vary greatly from 
those species actually Second, the Director based his de- 
terminations not on affirmative evidence demonstrating no jeopardy 
but instead on a lack of evidence to the contrary. Regarding the 
whooping crane, for example, the Director dismissed as unconvincing 
evidence advanced by wildlife proponents and adopted in large part 
by the GPC, which evidence tended to show that the project would 
harm such species.99 Following that, he commented on the uncer- 
tainty of the interrelationship of streamflow reductions and wet 
95. See A. BLEED, N. GALLEHAN, D. RAZAVIAN & R. SUPALLA, ECONOMIC, ENVI- 
RONMENT AND FJNANCING OPTIMIZATION A ALYSIS OF m l T E  RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
ALTERNATIVES (Univ. of Neb. Conservation & Survey Div., June 1986) (stating that the 
GPC instrearn flow requirements can be met and several projects can be built while 
meeting the requirements, although they would have to be reduced in size). 
96. NEB. REV. STAT. $ 37-435(3) (Reissue 1984). 
97. Order, supra note 11, at 13-17. 
98. It only mentioned, for example, and did not consider, the piping plover. Id. at 
13. 
99. Id. at 13-15. 
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meadow maintenance.100 Finally, the Director concluded that, as few 
cranes use the Platte Valley anyway, and as there are other habitat 
locations in the state, and as the project would effect its diversions at 
times when cranes would not be in the area, and as the overall num- 
bers of cranes nationally are on the rise, "it is inconceivable" that 
harm could occur.lOl 
This rationale, of course, is essentially irrelevant to the issue of 
whether the project will jeopardize the species or its habitat. Even if 
there are few cranes using the Platte Valley, those could be harmed, 
and the species jeopardized thereby. Even if there are other habitats 
available, this one could be harmed. Even if Catherland diversions 
would be off-season, they still could harm stream habitat and ecol- 
ogy. Even if the number of cranes overall is increasing, the project 
could jeopardize their numbers and continued existence. 
Regarding bald eagles, the DWR's decisional pattern was the 
same. It began by dismissing evidence and opinion of the GPC and 
concluded by substituting an unsubstantiated alternative view. Here 
its discussion centered exclusively on supposed defects and unwar- 
ranted assumptions in the GPC opinion.lo2 Then, the Director an- 
nounced his disagreement with the GPC conclusions103 and 
pronounced that "[tlhus, approval of Catherland's project is not 
deemed to jeopardize the continued existence of bald eagles or their 
habitat."lo4 
The entire exercise concluded as follows: "With an absence of ev- 
idence to the contrary, approving Catherland's applications is deemed 
not to jeopardize ferrets, falcons, plovers, or other rare and endan- 
gered species or their habitat."lo5 This conclusion concedes the de- 
fect: the order rests not upon affirmative evidence of an absence of 
jeopardy. Instead, the order is a default adjudication. It unflinch- 
ingly reaches conclusions even regarding species about which the 
DWR considered no evidence.lo6 
This approach is further deficient because it reverses the appro- 
priate burden of proof under the NESCA. The DWR understands 
where the burden lies, having stipulated in an earlier case that "[tlhe 
Nongame and Endangered Species Act places an obligation on Appli- 
100. Id. at 14. The discussion concluded: "There appears no basis for concludmg 
that the absence of 1,100 cubic feet per second during that time period would jeopard- 
ize whooping cranes." Id. 
101. Id. at 15. 
102. Id. 
103. Id, at 16. 
104. Id. The Order takes the same approach in its discussion of jeopardy to interior 
least terns. Id. at 16-17. 
105. Id. at 13. 
106. Id. 
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cants to show that their proposal will not adversely impact endan- 
gered or threatened species."lo7 Yet in this case it silently shifts the 
burden to wildlife proponents by approving the Catherland project 
when evidence failed to demonstrate no jeopardy. Presumably, the 
failure to prove no jeopardy should have produced a permit denial, 
not a permit award. This treatment falls palpably short of insuring 
no jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or their habitat. 
C. DID THE DWR ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES ACTIVELY AND 
AFFIRMATIVELY ASSURE REPRESENTATION OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST? 
The preceding discussion has already partially answered this 
question. It is apparent that no active and affirmative representation 
of the public interest by the DWR was undertaken here. Had the 
DWR undertaken such an affirmative posture, the order would have 
found its basis in fact rather than in default. 
Citations to the opinion are demonstrative. For example, the Di- 
rector concedes in the text that "limited evidence pertaining to envi- 
ronmental matters in the Catherland area" was available for its 
review.lo8 Despite this limited evidence, the decision purporting to 
protect the public interest was made. The order also admitted that 
"[iln terms of economic analysis, the record is without expert evi- 
dence indicating the likelihood of adverse economic consequences in 
the Platte Valley should the Catherland project be built and oper- 
ated."log Thus, the critical issue of economic impact was made "with- 
out expert evidence."l1° Regarding endangered species protection, 
the decision comments that despite "considerable effort [by the par- 
ties] in presenting evidence on the subject of nongame and endan- 
gered species,"lll still, "considering the entire spectrum of such 
species, only a small segment was addressed."l12 
D. DID THE DWR ADEQUATELY INCORPORATE THE WATER 
MANAGEMENT BOARD INTO ITS DECISIONMAKING? 
The answer to this question is no. The DWR decided the case 
without any record reference or consultation with the WMB. For rea- 
sons unexplained, it did not elect to refer the matter for WMB re- 
- - .. - - - - . .. . . 
107. Order Denying Application A-15738 for a Permit to Divert Water from the 
South Platte River for Storage in Enders Reservoir, Water Divisions 1-A and 1-B (Nov. 
4, 1985) (Neb. Dep't of Water Resources) ("Enders Opinion"). 
108. Order, supra note 11, at 5. 
109. Id. at 6. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 13. 
112. Id. 
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view and comment. The DWR thus decided to forego any benefit this 
separate and uniquely configured agency could have provided. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At this point in Nebraska's history, there is a critical need for in- 
telligent and broadbased water resources management. We believe 
that an assertive protection of public values in water, especially in 
the critical Platte River, is essential. That protection can only come 
if agencies charged with protecting those public values do so care- 
fully, and in line with their substantive and procedural obligations. 
The public does not receive this careful protection when the primary 
agency regulating such interests fails to secure sufficient data upon 
which to base its regulatory decisions, misinterprets and misapplies 
the statutes it is bound to discharge, and adopts procedures inade- 
quate to inform decisionmakers of the fundamental complexities 
their decisions implicate. Based on the Catherland decision, one must 
conclude there is great cause for concern. 
Were Catherland an aberration, that cause for concern would di- 
minish. But it may not be an aberration, as demonstrated by the only 
other relevant administrative decision by the DWR. The Enders case 
also involved a water rights application for an interbasin diversion 
that would affect Platte River flows113 and presented the same kinds 
of public interest issues as did the Catherland case. Although in this 
case the DWR denied the requested permit,l14 its administrative or- 
der bore the stamp of CatherZand. A representative sample of the 
Enders opinion is demonstrative: "[w]ithout additional data, most of 
the witnesses acknowledged they could make only qualitative assess- 
ments. With the exception of [one expert witness], who termed posi- 
tive versus negative impacts on birds to be a 'toss-up,' the experts 
stated that fish and wildlife impacts would most likely be negative if 
the project were built and operated."l15 On the matter of diminished 
flows for fish and wildlife, the agency characterized evidence as "es- 
pecially questionable for certain wildlife species."l16 "But, Applicants 
did not convincingly refute that assertion, and they propose no opera- 
tional scheme to assure that it would not happen. . . . Thus, in the 
context of fish and wildlife, benefits to the state in granting [their 
- - - -- - 
113. Specifically, the Enders project would take water from the South Platte 
River, directly upstream and tributary to the Platte River itself, for transport with and 
use in the Frenchman River Watershed. Order, supm note 104, at 2. 
114. Id. at 11. The Enders case is now on appeal before the Nebraska Supreme 
Court. In re Application No. A-15738, No. 86-008 (filed Jan. 3, 1986). 
115. Order, supm note 107, at 8. 
116. Id. 
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permit] would not outweigh benefits to the state from denying it."l17 
Only by a more comprehensive and careful decisional process can 
the DWR fulfill its statutory missions. Its failure to do so may result 
in a de facto shift of decisionmaking power to the Nebraska Supreme 
Court. 
